	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO	2007 DEC 18 PH 2: 13	On the second of
NURAH RAHMAN,) CASE NO. 1:07cv3166	<u>6</u> .	
Plaintiff,)) JUDGE DONALD C. NU	JGENT	
v.))	DINION	
DENNIS M. PILAWA,) <u>MEMORANDUM OF OI</u>) <u>AND ORDER</u>	<u> FINION</u>	
Defendant.)		

On October 15, 2007, <u>pro se</u> plaintiff Nurah Rahman filed the above captioned <u>in</u> forma pauperis case against attorney Dennis Pilawa. She claims simply that he "violated my civil rights by way of questioning my religion exstently [sic] and by way of telling me to wave [sic] my rights to read my transcript to my deposition statement." (Compl. at 1.) For the reasons stated below, this action is dismissed.

Although <u>prose</u> <u>se</u> pleadings are liberally construed, <u>Boag v. MacDougall</u>, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam); <u>Haines v. Kerner</u>, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the district court is required to dismiss an action under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.¹ Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). For the reasons stated below, this action is dismissed pursuant to section 1915(e).

Principles requiring generous construction of <u>pro</u> <u>se</u> pleadings are not without limits. <u>Beaudett v. City of Hampton</u>, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277 (4th Cir. 1985). District courts are not required to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them or to construct full blown claims from sentence fragments. <u>Id.</u> at 1278. To do so would "require ...[the courts] to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a <u>pro se</u> plaintiff, ... [and] would...transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party." <u>Id.</u> at 1278.

Liberally construing this as a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. §1983, Ms. Rahman must plead and prove that the defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived her of a right secured by the Constitution and law of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Section 1983 alone creates no substantive rights; rather it is the means through which a plaintiff may seek redress for deprivations of rights established in the Constitution or federal laws. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979). The statute applies only if there is a deprivation of a

A claim may be dismissed <u>sua sponte</u>, without prior notice to the plaintiff and without service of process on the defendant, if the court explicitly states that it is invoking section 1915(e) [formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)] and is dismissing the claim for one of the reasons set forth in the statute. <u>McGore v. Wrigglesworth</u>, 114 F.3d 601, 608-09 (6th Cir. 1997); <u>Spruytte v. Walters</u>, 753 F.2d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 1985), <u>cert. denied</u>, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986); <u>Harris v. Johnson</u>, 784 F.2d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1986); <u>Brooks v. Seiter</u>, 779 F.2d 1177, 1179 (6th Cir. 1985).

constitutional right. See e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 699-701(1976); Baker, 443 U.S. at 146-47. Thus, "[t]he first inquiry in any § 1983 suit ... is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right 'secured by the Constitution and laws'" of the United States. Baker, 443 U.S. at 140.

Ms. Rahman fails to assert any constitutional basis for liability in this case. Not only does she not name a state actor as the defendant, there is no basis in law upon which she can rest her stated assertions. Even liberally construed, the complaint does not contain allegations reasonably suggesting Ms. Rahman might have a valid federal claim.

Accordingly, plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted and this action is dismissed under section 1915(e). The court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.²

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DONALD C. NUGENT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

² 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) provides:

An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies that it is not taken in good faith.